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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
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MAXIMILUAN ROBERTO SEALE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 910010

])

Priority No. 2

]

REPLY BRIEF

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's contemporaneous objection to the admission of the alleged
victims' videotaped statements specifically raised the constitutional issue of right of
confrontation and that issue has been properly preserved for appellate review.
Further, Defendant's hearsay objection to the admission of statements
allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones was specific and contemporaneous and that issue has
likewise been preserved for appellate review.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED A CONFRONTATION
CHALLENGE TO THE ADMISSION OF THE VIDEOTAPED
STATEMENTS.
In Point II of its brief, the State argues that the Defendant did not make a
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specific, contemporaneous objection which adequately raised, in the trial court, the
Defendant's contention that the admission of the videotaped statements would deny him
the right of confrontation.
The State contends:
Defendant's resistance at trial to the admission of the videotape was
based solely on his view that the statement did not meet the
statutory and rule requirement of reliability and trustworthiness
[citations omitted]. If defendant had raised at trial the specific
confrontation issue from Wright that he now raises on appeal, he
would have given Judge Eves the chance to avoid a potential
constitutional error that could result in reversal.
Appellee's Brief at p. 30.
In making his objection to the admission of the videotape, trial counsel
stated:
[BY MR. WINCHESTER] The interest of justice, in my opinion, would
require this court to look at the reliability of the tape and weigh that
against a defendant's constitutional right under both the United
States Constitution and our state constitution to be able to crossexamine witnesses.
I can't cross-examine that videotape. I can't cross-examine the
statements made therein. And as the court has now seen I think it
would be futile to try to cross-examine [P.W.].
*

*

*

That's the very predicament which Mr. Seale finds himself. If this
court allows the tape to come in, he has no way of cross-examining
the statements made on that tape. And I believe he's denied his
constitutional right to face his witness - to face the accused and to
cross-examine the witness.
T 105-106.
The trial court clearly understood the objection to have constitutional
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dimensions including questions regarding the right of confrontation.
[BY THE COURT] This is a troubling portion of our law. As you
know, the statute is relatively new. The concept is sort of
revolutionary. The idea that a defendant can be faced with
conviction by a videotape and never have the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant in the videotape is a concept that although it's
embodied in the statute still has to test the - or still has to fact the
test of constitutionality.
T 111.
The State's contention that the Defendant failed to adequately raise the
constitutional issue at the trial level is without merit.

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE ALLEGED
VICTIMS' PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE TO ELIZABETH JONES WAS
SPECIFIC AND THE ISSUE HAS BEEN PROPERLY PRESERVED
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
When the prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony regarding out-of-court
statements which J.W. and P.W. had allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones, defense counsel
objected:
[BY MR. WINCHESTER] Your honor, I'll object to statements made
by the children on the same basis as the objection yesterday that
regarded the social worker from Idaho.
T176.
On the preceding day, the prosecutor had attempted to elicit a hearsay
statement from Mary Riggs, a social worker from Jerome, Idaho.

Defense counsel

specifically stated his objection: "Objection, your honor. I believe the response will be
hearsay." (T117)
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The trial court obviously understood the objection to Elizabeth Jones'
testimony to be hearsay for in overruling the objection the court did so on the basis that
the statements were "admissible as prior consistent statement, and therefore, it would be
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, the credibility of the victims having been
questioned." (T 176) It cannot reasonably be argued that the trial court misunderstood
the objection.
"Hearsay" is not a "generic objection" as the State suggests. "Hearsay" is
a specific objection. It draws the trial court's attention to the contention that the pending
response will include out-of-court statements which the proponent offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Trial counsel is not obliged to identify each
exception to the rule against hearsay or argue its inapplicability.
The State's contention that trial counsel did not adequately identify the
nature of Defendant's objection is without merit.
The State further contends that any error arising out of the admission of
Elizabeth Jones' testimony was harmless and in footnote 18 on page 48 of the Appellee's
Brief, the State argues:
In light of the evidence at trial, including the testimony of J.W. and
the videotaped statement of P. W. and the unchallenged but similar
prior statements to Dr. Sugden and their Aunt Cheryl in Idaho,
defendant could not make the requisite showing that the alleged
evidentiary error in admitting the statements to Elizabeth was
harmful.
In making this argument, the State overlooks several important facts. First,
the statements made to Dr. Sugden and Cheryl Vanleishout were not spontaneous and
were far removed in time from the statements allegedly made to Elizabeth Jones.
4

Second, the statements made to Dr. Sugden were made during the investigative stage
of the proceedings and in no way relate to any offense allegedly committed against P.W.
Finally, the statements allegedly made to Cheryl Vanleishout were not admitted to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. In admitting this evidence the court instructed the jury:
[BY THE COURT] Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am going to
allow the statement to stand and overrule the objection. But you
need to understand that the statements that are being given now by
this witness and which are being attributed to [J.W.] are not being
introduced for the truth of the content of those statements. In other
words, not to prove that what [J.W.] said was true, but rather to
demonstrate that a complaint was made and the circumstances
under which the complaint was made.
T 138-139.
The prejudice associated with the admission of statements allegedly made
to Elizabeth Jones is manifest. First, the statement was admitted as a prior consistent
statement of P.W. notwithstanding the fact that, at that point in the proceedings, P.W.'s
videotaped statement had not been admitted into evidence and P.W. had made no incourt accusation against the Defendant.
Second, relating to J.W., the statement was admitted, not to rebut an
express or an implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, but
to reinforce J.W.'s testimony in light of mere contradiction provided through the testimony
of one of the state's own witnesses, Alice Chapman.

CONCLUSION
The State's contentions that the Defendant failed to make specific and
contemporaneous objections which preserved the constitutional and hearsay issues for
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appellate review are without merit.
DATED this j£_

day of July, 1991.

Gary
W. Pendleton
an/W.
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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